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THE ENVIRONMENT: PRIVATE OR COMMON
PROPERTY?
ZEV TRACHTENBERG*
Taken together, the three papers presented here raise a question that strikes at
the core of Western thought about property. The question is, should environmen-
tal goods be treated as private or as common property? This question obviously
has profound importance for public policy regarding the environment. But it is
also of profound philosophical interest, since it reveals a fundamental tension that
has always existed in European thinking about property: between property as a
private right, and as a public resource. This tension is visible, for example, in the
writings of the natural law theorists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
For Grotius, for Pufendorf, indeed for Locke himself, the problem of property is
the problem of explaining how the goods of the Earth, given by God to Mankind
in common, can be rightfully divided up and placed under the exclusive control
of private individuals.' The structure of these authors' arguments, and the
obligations they place on private ownership, show the tension between the
competing conceptions of property, i.e., between the ideas that goods most
fundamentally belong to individuals, or to a community.2
This tension between privacy and commonality is, in my view, conceptually
ineliminable. Any conception of property that emphasizes one aspect to the
exclusion of the other is only partial; fuller consideration of property will find the
other aspect reasserting itself.3 Thus, I do not think that we can find a
conclusive, formulaic resolution .of the tension - in favor of one side or the
other, or that establishes some set combination of them. We do better, rather, to
strike a dynamic balance between privacy and commonality - a balance that will
shift in response to particular circumstances
* Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma. Ph.D., 1988, Columbia
University; M. Phil., 1981, University College London; B.A., 1977, Amherst College.
1. See HUGo GRoTius, THE LAw OF WAR AND PEACE 186 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Bobbs-Merrill
Co., Inc. 1925) (1646); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATiSE OF GOVERNMENT 18 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690); SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CrrTzEN ACCORDING
TO NATURAL LAw 84 (James Tully ed. & Michael Siverthome trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1673).
2. The Lockean proviso that appropriators in the original commons leave "enough, and as good" for
others is perhaps the clearest instance of this tension at work. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 21.
3. This fact contributes to the often noted ad hoc quality of takings jurisprudence. For parallel
arguments, though regarding different tensions in the concept of property, see MARGARET J. RADIN,
Diagnosing the Takings Problem, in REINTERPRI-NG PROPERTY 146 (1993); Carol M. Rose, Matron
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984); Mark Sagoff,
Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 825 (1997).
4. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUs'iCE 34 (1971) (providing Rawls' account of what he calls
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This pragmatic approach can be seen at work in the papers by Andrew Sawyer
and John Echeverria. Sawyer calls for a balance between private and common
notions of property, when he concludes his paper with the suggestion that the
property right in land could be treated more like water rights, in the sense that
absolute dominion over one's property might yield a bit to the concept of
stewardship. That is, one's "own" property could be seen as subject not only to
the obligation not to harm others directly, but also to the obligation to maintain
a common resource in which others have legitimate interest. Similarly, Echever-
ria's conclusion suggests that rather than subscribing exclusively to one
conception of property, environmentalists ought to appeal both to the concept of
public ownership (to assert that the public lands are ours),5 and to the political
values protected by a strong right to private property (to affirm that property
rights help preserve autonomy). Echeverria's broader discussion of the politics of
the property rights movement is in keeping with his conceptual pluralism
regarding property, since pluralism in effect calls for an essentially political
process of negotiation between parties who might hold divergent principles, but
share a recognition that they must live together. I will return to the issue of
politics below.
In contrast, James Huffman's article gives exclusive emphasis to the private
dimension of property. For that reason I find his argument unpersuasive, and I
will spend most of this comment trying to show that it suffers from its denial that
there is any value to conceiving of environmental goods as common property.
This denial works in two ways - regarding the fundamental nature of property,
and also regarding the mechanisms by which property is distributed. Let us
examine each way in turn.
First, Huffman holds that due to the individualized character of consumption,
all property, in some ultimate sense, is private. Thus, he argues, private property
is inevitable. The things human beings value are scarce, relative to the number
of people who value them. Only one person can stand at the podium at a time,
to cite his initial example, and the occupier of that position is, quoting him, "in
a very real sense, the owner of the podium at the moment."' In general, any time
one person's enjoyment of a scarce good - a spectacular view of the Grand
Canyon, or the pleasure of floating the Colorado through it - excludes others'
enjoyment of that good, that first person can be said to own the good, to have
property in it.
But it is hardly clear that Huffman's examples support the idea that the speaker
at the podium or the hiker at the Grand Canyon have ownership, in what Anthony
Honor6 has called the full liberal sense of the term.7 Huffman's possession of the
"intuitionism").
5. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24
ENVTL LAW 1, 25-31 (1994) (arguing that we can regard the environment as a gift given to human
beings in common, under the trustee-like obligation to pass it along to succeeding generations).
6. James L. Huffman, The Public Interest in Private Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L. R-V. 377, 377
(1997).
7. See Anthony Honol6, Ownership, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 107 (A.G. Guest
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goods in question is temporary and very limited in scope; he may not do most of
the things we associate with ownership of property. Further, Huffman's putative
right to private property is established by simply ignoring other claims to the
goods in question that are as valid as his own. Take the case of the podium. Of
course its real owner is the University of Oklahoma. Considered with respect to
the University, Huffman is by no means the owner, but at most holder of a
temporary usufruct. Considered with respect to other speakers, Huffman has a
share in the use of a common resource, provided by the University for a certain
purpose. None of these speakers has a greater degree of control over the podium
than any other; for none does their grant of use rise to the level of ownership.
The case is even clearer with the Grand Canyon. Whereas Huffman speaks of the
visitor "owning" some piece of the park, it makes more sense to speak of the
visitor having the right to use the park - a right assigned by the park's actual
owner: the public of the United States, for whom the Grand Canyon is common
property, administered by the government.
How then does Huffman go from mere use to full ownership, to private
property? His argument makes much of the notion of scarcity - scarcity requires
exclusion of others. But nothing in his examples shows why that exclusion must
be permanent - nor, as he acknowledges, why it grants any other control over
the object than is needed for the specific use involved. And this is not really
surprising, since it is easy to imagine cases where, rather than excluding others,
the appropriate response to scarcity would be to share. Indeed, the imperative that
scarcity requires sharing is at the core of the natural rights tradition to which
Huffman appeals, and is based on the idea that in some originary way the goods
of the Earth are common to the entire community of Mankind.8 Thus, Huffman's
appeal to scarcity fails to show why property cannot be common, but must be
conceived only as private.
Consideration of scarcity leads us to the second way Huffman denies the value
of thinking of environmental goods as common property. It is certainly the case,
as Huffman suggests, that scarcity - for that matter, the logical character of
consumption - requires that goods be distributed. Where a good is scarce we
must figure out a system for allowing its users to use it undisturbed. But while
it is necessary that there be some rules or other to govern the distribution of
goods, that need does not in itself predetermine the character of the particular
distributive rules in force. Note that where goods are treated as private property,
the institution for distributing them to users is, of course, the market. But as we
saw above, goods need not be treated as private property: there is a conceptual
gap between use and ownership. Thus, environmental goods in particular are
standardly treated as common property, and for common property the distributive
institution is standardly the political system.
Now we can elicit from Huffman's paper the following argument: distribution
by the market is morally preferable to distribution by the political system, hence
ed., 1961).
8. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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it is preferable to treat environmental goods as the form of property appropriate
to the market (i.e. private property) than as the form appropriate to politics (i.e.
common property). I do not wish to attack the market; rather, I want to question
Huffman's attack on politics as distributive institution. He seems to suspect that
environmentalists who use the political process to assert control over public
resources through regulation are making an illegitimate demand on others: they
are seeking to satisfy their own preferences at others' expense. And that would
be wrong. Note in this context his suggestion that those who want to see water
left in streams to benefit fish should be able to buy a private property right in
instream flows. Privatizing river functions in this fashion would be economically
more efficient than regulation. No one who didn't care about fish would be forced
to pay for their maintenance, since those who do care would bear the full cost.
That is, it would be morally preferable to "distribute" the environmental good at
issue here by market mechanisms.
But why is it wrong for environmentalists to make demands of their fellow
citizens to contribute to the cost of maintaining certain values? What is morality,
if not a demand on others? The individual's moral appeal to his or her natural
rights is certainly a demand that others act a certain way towards him or her.
Thus, when I claim a natural right of property in my watch, I demand that
everyone else leave me undisturbed in my possession of it. The case is strictly
analogous when an environmentalist makes a moral appeal that publicly owned,
common property ought to be managed a certain way.' The appeal is less
unequivocal perhaps than one regarding something simple like personal property.
No single person may dictate what is done with public property; it is up to the
public as a whole to decide, by the political process established for that process.
But the environmentalist's appeal has the logical status of an appeal in a moral
argument made to the public, that it is morally better to manage its property one
way rather than another. If that position is duly accepted by the public, the fact
that it makes demands on the individuals who constitute the public is hardly
sinister, or exploitative. It is a simple consequence of democracy, no more
contentious or mysterious than the fact that people who vote for a losing
candidate accept the authority of the winner.
To conclude, Huffman's article argues that, for both logical and moral reasons,
environmental goods are best conceived under the rubric of private property. In
this respect it is representative of a position that elevates the private and
downplays the common dimension of property. But I have tried to show that it
is harder than Huffman thinks to write commonality out of the script, so to speak.
Indeed, I hold, the very concept of property is defined as much by the notion that
there is a common claim to the goods of the earth as by the notion that
individuals have exclusive rights over what is their own. This is by no means to
say that any given item should be subject to public control. Rather, it is my view
that for different categories of goods, and in different circumstances of life,
different decisions are best as to the extent the goods in question should be
9. See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 4 (1988).
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considered as private or common property. It follows that there will also be
different decisions about whether the market or the political system is the best
mechanism for distributing the goods in question." Where the goods in question
are environmental, the common dimension cannot be avoided. This is why, I
believe, it is inevitable that their distribution is a matter for politics.
10. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 119-23 (1983).
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